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The Structure of Subchapter C: An
Anthropological Comment*
To the Editors:
A striking feature of contemporary legal theory is its narrow focus. A
Martian reading fashionable jurisprudence might imagine that everything
important could be learned by combining a few common law cases with
the hottest news from the Supreme Court. By indulging this neotradi-
tionalist premise, we close ourselves off from the most distinctive aspects
of our legal culture: whatever else is obscure, it is clear that we are living
in an age of the activist state, in which legislation and administration are
central elements of the professional experience. How has this transforma-
tion affected the substance and form of legal argument?
There are, I suppose, countless conceivable answers. At one extreme, the
rise of the activist state may have led to very little alteration in the struc-
ture of legal culture. Lawyers may argue and opine before activist legis-
latures and agencies in much the same way as they do before common
law courts. At the other extreme, there may have been a radical transfor-
mation of the shape of legal discourse; new habits developed in activist
forums may in time undermine the old conventions of classical adjudica-
tory institutions. More likely, perhaps, is the intermediate possibility that
traditional and innovative elements combine in different ways in different
substantive areas and institutional contexts.
Only one thing is plain: our ignorance. We lack an accurate map of
the present shape of our own legal culture. Not that we don't have slo-
gans: courts are the home of reasoned elaboration; agencies, of expertise;
legislatures, of will. Yet if we are to move beyond such simplicities, we
must explore with greater sensitivity the patterns of argument and de-
cision actually employed in various parts of the expanding legal universe.
This is the great merit of Robert Clark's recent essay on corporate taxa-
tion.' Rather than manipulating the rules to achieve a particular outcome,
he asks whether they "can be understood in terms of a few fundamental
ideas or themes, rather than as a disordered manifold of particular products
and activities .... ."2 Professor Clark's effort to make sense of his spe-
cialty is rewarded by an interpretation of the law's notorious complexity
* I am grateful to many of my colleagues for stimulating conversation. Bob Clark's
help is especially appreciated.
1. The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and Reform,
87 YALE L.J. 90 (1977) [hereinafter cited by page number only].
2. P. 91.
Correspondence
in terms of seven abstract principles, each recognized quite early in the
history of the field.3 The proliferation of complex rules is viewed as
the result of efforts by taxpayers and tax collectors to exploit the am-
biguities and conflicts latent in the Seven Principles. Though economic
self-interest provides the energy for doctrinal development, this energy
does not generate a mass of mindless legal detail. Instead, it is transformed
by lawyers into a coherent form of cultural activity in which rules are
ordered into meaningful patterns.
4
I shall not attempt to comment on the accuracy of Professor Clark's
picture of corporate tax doctrine. Instead, I shall assume its validity in
order to hunt for clues to the more general question with which I be-
gan. After all, if Professor Clark is to be believed, we have uncovered a
body of rules that is far removed from the traditional common law5 yet
nonetheless reveals at least a semblance of pattern. What is its relationship
to other patterns-both traditional and emerging-that exist in contem-
porary legal discourse?
There are, once again, two polar possibilities. On the one hand, Clark's
Seven Principles may bear no intelligible relationship to other areas of
legal doctrine. This conclusion would support the idea that the rise of the
activist state has fractured the legal culture, bringing in its train a dra-
matic transformation of the patterns of legal argument. On the other hand,
a scrutiny of the Seven Principles may suggest that they are closely related
to the legal ideas deployed in other areas of conflict resolution. This would
suggest that the legal culture has some resilience-that it can adapt to a
major political and social transformation without a total loss of coherence.
This second interpretation-which I shall call the hypothesis of cultural
coherence-provides the more convincing explanation of the relationships
among Clark's Seven Principles and other areas of legal doctrine. 6 To
3. Professor Clark's Seven Principles are:
(1) There shall be a separate tax on corporate income (The separate tax principle)
(see pp. 97-100);
(2) A shareholder-level tax on corporate income shall be imposed, but generally only
upon its distribution to shareholders (The distribution principle) (see pp. 100-04);
(3) Long-term capital gains shall be taxed at rates substantially lower than those
applicable to ordinary income (The capital gains principle) (see pp. 104-06);
(4) Corporate distributions to shareholders are presumptively to be treated not as
capital gains but as ordinary income, that is, as dividends (The dividend principle)
(see pp. 106-07);
(5) Shareholder dispositions of stock are presumptively to be treated purely as dis-
positions of capital assets, that is, independently of corporate-level events (The corporate
veil principle) (see pp. 107-17);
(6) Formal changes in corporate-shareholder relationships that nevertheless involve
a substantial continuity of ownership in a business enterprise shall not be recognized for
tax purposes (The nonrecognition principle) (see pp. 117-30);
(7) Corporate distributions in kind shall not create taxable gain or loss to the cor-
poration (The General Utilities principle) (see pp. 130-35).
4. See pp. 94-96.
5. As Professor Clark points out, the principles of corporate taxation have remarkably
few common law roots. P. 96. Rather, they proceed directly from the complex forms of
legislative-bureaucratic-judicial interaction characteristic of the modern state.
6. I should emphasize at once that coherence may be judged a good or bad thing,
depending on the values central to the legal culture and those central to the evaluator.
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refine this hypothesis, I shall first set out some basic concepts that will
guide the analysis. Section II then tries to show that Clark's Seven Prin-
ciples do in fact confirm cultural coherence; this in effect marks the place
of Subchapter C in the larger legal culture. Section III considers the sig-
nificance of reform efforts of the kind represented by the last part of
Professor Clark's article: 7 does reform suggest an impending transformation
in the structure of our legal culture? Answering this question will permit
Section IV to glimpse a more complex pattern of lawyerly adaptation
to the activist state.
I. The Idea of Structural Analysis
Let us begin by defining some terms. Distinguish, first, between sub-
stantive principles and structural principles. Substantive principles express
the abstract ideas that guide the concrete resolution of a particular class of
disputes.8 All of Professor Clark's Principles are substantive. To resolve a
dispute between the Internal Revenue Service and a corporate taxpayer,
a lawyer must know that there is a separate tax on corporate income,
that corporate distributions are presumed to be dividends, and so forth.
Structural principles, in contrast, describe the relationships among substan-
tive principles in different fields. Mine is a structural inquiry, for I am
exploring the conceptual relationships among the principles of corporate
taxation and those of other fields of law.
A second set of terms is required to describe the way we will draw our
structural map. What kinds of relationship could the principles of cor-
porate taxation bear to those guiding other fields of lawyerly dispute
resolution? The first important possibility is autonomy. Two groups of
substantive principles, A and B, are autonomous from one another when
lawyers do not take A into account when framing B, and vice versa. For
example, a typical American lawyer invokes the distinctive principles of
contract law-say, the consideration doctrine-without recognizing any need
to consider whether Brown v. Board of Education was rightly decided.
Similarly, lawyers arguing about the real meaning of Brown would not
seek inspiration from the consideration doctrine.9 Autonomous principles
This normative inquiry, however important it may be, is not my concern here. Instead,
I am engaging in a positive investigation of the extent to which American legal dis-
course can in fact be ordered into an intelligible whole.
7. Pp. 153-61.
8. The precise logical status of substantive principles, as well as their relationship
to legal rules, is a much-argued matter. See, e.g., Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35
U. CH. L. REv. 14 (1967); Dworkin, Social Rules and Legal Theory, 81 YALE L.J. 855
(1972); Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits of Law, 81 YALE L.J. 823 (1972). For present
purposes, it suffices to proceed from the brute fact that principles like Clark's Seven
are indeed customarily invoked in legal argument.
9. It is, of course, easy to imagine a legal culture in which this report would be
factually wrong-a culture in which lawyers would refer to Brown in arguing about con-
sideration, or vice versa. In making my claim about autonomy, I do not mean to assert
that a conceptual link between race and contract is impossible but simply to report a
contingent fact about the existing structure of legal discourse. Indeed, it is this focus upon
the contingent facts of a particular culture that marks my study as anthropological. See
C. GEERTz, THE INTERPRErATION OF CULTURES 33-54 (1973).
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stand in splendid isolation from one another in legal discourse. If all of
Clark's Seven Principles were autonomous from all other legal ideas, they
would present a polar case of legal innovation.
Complete autonomy, however, is an extreme condition. In justifying
and framing principles for area A, lawyers often recognize that the prin-
ciples governing B are relevant to their problem. This kind of dependence
may take two different forms. The principles for A may serve as a source
of arguments for defining the principles for B, while B does not serve as
a similar source of inspiration when lawyers try to frame and justify prin-
ciples governing A. Here, A dominates B, and B is subordinate to A. On
the other hand, A and B may establish a relationship of reciprocity: either
may be invoked as a source of argument in a lawyer's evaluation of the
other. These relationships of domination, subordination, and reciprocity
are familiar (if not by name) to any lawyer who can play competently
with common law precedents. 10 The next question is whether the ideas
governing corporate taxation may be mapped in a similar way.
II. The Structure of Subchapter C
Professor Clark's First Principle sets the stage for a conceptual field
with very modest claims to autonomy within the legal culture. Tell a
lawyer that there will be a separate tax on corporate income (Principle
One), and he will automatically assume that he may apply his general
understanding of corporate and tax doctrine to this area of cultural in-
tersection. As lawyers juxtapose familiar corporate and tax principles in
new ways, new stresses will appear, and new questions will be asked and
answered. Over time, these answers may give rise to substantive principles
autonomous from either Tax or Corporations or both. These autonomous
principles may in turn be borrowed by lawyers working in other fields-
subordinating areas of law that were previously autonomous or dominant.
But if the First Principle captures an important element of the cultural
reality constructed by an emerging group of legal specialists, we should
expect Corporate Taxation's location in the legal culture to be mapped
largely in terms of subordination and reciprocity rather than autonomy and
domination.
The First Principle serves a second cautionary function. Not only does
it warn against an easy assumption of autonomy, but it emphasizes that
we are in the presence of a peculiar hybrid structure. In fashioning a
distinctive form of discourse, specialists in corporate taxation will have to
make their peace along two quite different conceptual boundaries-one
defining their relationship to general ideas developed in corporate law, the
other marking their relationship to general principles of taxation. These
boundaries may be organized on very similar or very different structural
lines. The question is whether the Seven Principles reveal something about
10. I do not mean to suggest, of course, that these relationships adequately describe
all the important structures of a lawyer's reality. For an exploration along different, if
related, dimensions, see my PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION (1977), especially
Chapters One and Seven.
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the way the profession has in fact resolved its problems of boundary defi-
nition.
Turning first to the corporate frontier, two of Professor Clark's Prin-
ciples transparently presuppose the most fundamental idea in corporate
law-that the corporation is an entity distinct from its shareholders. It
"follows" from this idea that when a shareholder sells his stock, this trans-
action should be viewed independently of corporate-level events (Principle
Five) and that a tax on shareholder-level income should generally be im-
posed only when the income is formally distributed to shareholders (Prin-
ciple Two). To deny either of these principles would require a lawyer
to assert that corporate tax law is structurally autonomous from corporate
law rather than dependent on it. Moreover, the dependence involved
seems of the subordinating variety-by adopting Principles Two and Five,
the corporate tax lawyer is simply borrowing a basic idea from the dom-
inant field without generating a reciprocal expectation that Two and Five
will be invoked by corporate practitioners concerned with nontax matters.
In contrast, the relation between corporate tax and other areas of tax
practice seems to be organized on a different structural principle. Rather
than domination and subordination, reciprocity marks the pattern of de-
pendence on this second conceptual boundary. Thus the Third Principle,
which entrenches the distinction between capital gains and ordinary in-
come, is the intellectual property of all tax lawyers regardless of whether
they spend their time on corporate, individual, or estate matters. And a
significant conceptual development in the treatment of capital gains or
ordinary income in one sub-specialty is likely to be used as an argument
for an analogous modification in the others."
Principles Two, Three, and Five, then, mark Corporate Taxation as a
hybrid structure whose pattern of discourse is dependent for its signifi-
cance upon two larger patterns of professional argument. The Fourth
Principle, however, has a different structural status. Here the question is
whether corporate distributions are ordinary income or capital gains. Now
this looks like something new: the lawyer must forge a new conceptual
link between a category of corporate law (distributions) and categories of
tax law (ordinary income and capital gains). The only reason why this
link must be established is that a new field of professional activity-cor-
porate tax-has come into existence. In answering the question, then, a
lawyer must juxtapose categories in a way that suggests the possibility of
an autonomous answer, one that does not depend upon more general
principles.
Yet Principle Four suggests that this possibility for autonomy has not
11. As Professor Clark indicates, the distinction between capital gains and ordinary
income gained statutory recognition in both corporate and individual taxation at the
same time. Pp. 104-05. More generally, many of the leading corporate tax cases have
been borrowed by tax lawyers operating in other areas, and vice versa. See, for example,
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940), whose corporate impact is noted by B. BIT-rKER
& L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME, ESTATE AND Gir TAXATION 424 (4th ed. 1972), and Gregory
v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), whose general impact is considered by Chirelstein,
Learned Hand's Contribution to the Law of Tax Avoidance, 77 YALE L.J. 440, 452-59
(1968).
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been exploited with great energy. To see this, contrast two different ways
in which a corporate tax lawyer might try to solve the problem of dis-
tributions. First, he could rely as much as possible on traditional corporate
categories to provide a point of intellectual entry into his problem. For
example, since corporate law distinguishes between "dividends" and the
"return of capital," the corporate tax lawyer might frame his inquiry in a
similar fashion, asking himself whether a particular distribution is a
"dividend," as defined by substantive corporate law principles, as a pre-
liminary to determining its tax status. Alternatively, he could reject these
dominating cues and discriminate among corporate distributions in a way
that seems to him to grasp more completely the distinctive elements of his
corporate tax problem. 12 Such an autonomizing move would require the
lawyer to elaborate classifications that would constantly remind him of
the cognitive boundary separating his discourse from that of corporate
law. Indeed, these new categories might, over time, be used as a source
for revising received doctrine in the nontax areas of corporate practice-
in which case corporate tax would dominate (at least in some respects)
one of its cognitive progenitors.
Principle Four tells us, however, that the law has not traveled down
this second path to autonomy. Rather than rejecting corporate cues, the
law has based its tax categories upon them-establishing a rule that dis-
tributions are presumed to be "dividends" and linking dividends to the
category of ordinary income. 13 In short, the Fourth Principle is autono-
mous in the same way that a pedestrian walkway connecting the fourth
floors of two different department stores is independent of the buildings
it connects.
With the Sixth Principle, however, a greater autonomy comes into its
own. This "nonrecognition" idea serves notice that events of profound
importance in corporate law are irrelevant to the corporate tax lawyer.
Even though one corporation is dissolved and another takes its place,
there will be no tax consequences so long as something called "continuity"
in ownership is maintained. This is a move of great structural significance.
It permits practitioners in very different legal areas to borrow the doctrine
of "continuity" if it seems to offer a convenient way of dealing with their
immediate problems. Assume, for example, that a new corporation seeks
to avoid the collective bargaining agreement executed by its predecessor.
14
It is not impossible to imagine a judge looking to the "continuity" doc-
trine in corporate tax law to solve his similar-seeming problem in labor
law. Of course, the chances of this happening now are not very great.' 5
12. For an effort to make just this kind of autonomizing move in a related context,
see Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YALE L.J. 1585,
1586-89 (1974).
13. As Professor Clark notes, the high economic stakes have generated pressures to
sharpen the line separating dividends from other distributions taxed at more advan-
tageous rates. Pp. 106-07. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 301(c). Nonetheless, Professor Clark's dis-
cussion makes it plain that these rules are merely refinements of a conceptual blueprint
provided by corporate law. See pp. 100-01, 106-07.
14. See, e.g., John Wiley & Sons v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964).
15. My colleague Jack Getman, an avid student of labor law, tells me that he has
never in fact seen a judge borrowing from the tax law in the way hypothesized in the text.
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For a complicated set of reasons-most of them quite obscure-the struc-
tural linkages between tax law and labor law are very weak. The two
seem relatively autonomous strands in the seamless web. Nonetheless, even
the possibility of a linkage suggests something about the potential au-
tonomy of the corporate tax law generated by the Sixth Principle.
There is, however, a second structural aspect to nonrecognition. While
the Sixth Principle marks a wall of cognitive autonomy from corporate law
principles, it does not indicate an equivalent autonomy from those of tax
law. On the contrary, as Professor Clark emphasizes, "these nonrecogni-
tion rules embody the general notion of income tax law that accrued gain
must be realized before it will be taxed."'16 Hence, the Sixth Principle
should not be read as a declaration of independence. Rather, it suggests
that when tax principles and corporate principles point in different di-
rections, reciprocity with tax principles dominates subordination to cor-
porate ideas.
The Sixth Principle, then, has a complex structural status. First, it may
be used as a dominant source of principles for previously autonomous
structures (like labor law); second, it marks the achievement of a limited
autonomy from a conceptual field (corporations) to which it has been
structurally subordinate; yet, third, this achievement of a limited autonomy
and a potential dominance has been purchased at the cost of a deeper
structural commitment to reciprocity with allied fields of professional ac-
tivity (individual taxation). In emphasizing this limitation on the area's
cultural autonomy, however, I do not mean to belittle the importance of
structural movements of the kind the Sixth Principle represents. Indeed,
it is by a series of such moves that a previously subordinate field can gain
increasing measures of cultural autonomy, dominance, and reciprocity.
Thus, having refused "recognition" to certain corporate law dogmas, one
can imagine the corporate tax law's refusing "recognition" to principles
applied to the taxation of noncorporate entities. With every twist and
turn, it will become increasingly unclear to well-trained lawyers that cor-
porate tax is a dependent hyrid rather than a relatively autonomous area
of legal development in its own right. And with the field's rise to au-
tonomy, lawyers may use their understanding of corporate taxation as a
source for inspiration in their efforts to reform areas at greater structural
distance.
Clark's Seventh Principle, however, indicates how far we are from such
a situation. Here, at last, appears an idea structurally autonomous from
general tax principles-the General Utilities refusal to recognize in-kind
distributions as corporate income. Moreover, Professor Clark demonstrates
that the Seventh Principle has successfully entrenched itself in the cul-
tural field in a number of familiar ways. 17 What is important here, though,
are telltale signs indicating that the Principle's claim to structural au-
tonomy from general taxation is exceedingly vulnerable. First, as Pro-
fessor Clark shows,' 8 it is quite possible to reverse the General Utilities
16. P. 117.
17. See pp. 130-35.
18. P. 152.
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principle without revolutionizing the cognitive structure of the corporate
tax field. This contrasts sharply with a decision to alter any of the earlier
Principles on Professor Clark's list-which would bring in its wake a radi-
cal restructuring of the practitioner's intellectual equipment. 19 Second,
General Utilities is not only cognitively isolated, but also evaluatively in-
congruous. Most knowledgeable professionals, feeling the structural pull of
general tax principles, would agree that General Utilities doesn't make
much sense. Not only does this make General Utilities a constant subject
of reform efforts, but it also diminishes the principle's potential as a model
for reform in other areas. The anomalous status of the Seventh Principle,
in short, suggests the difficulty the present legal community has in sealing
the cognitive boundary between general taxation and corporate taxation.
An inspection of the Seven Principles, then, provides some tentative sup-
port for the hypothesis of cultural coherence. Though embryonic sugges-
tions of increasing autonomy are present, Professor Clark has described a
complex but dependent hybrid structure. Moreover, the field's successful au-
tonomizing moves are in the direction of establishing independence from
corporate ideas; similar efforts on the second front with general principles
of taxation seem far less successful.
i1. The Structure of Reform
It is not enough, however, to describe the present structural situation.
As Professor Clark's concluding section indicates, the historical product
we have analyzed is now under increasing attack. Drastic reform proposals
are in the air. What are their structural implications?
The first thing to emphasize is that many substantive reforms do not
portend a significant structural reorganization of the conceptual field. Imag-
ine, for example, that some principle, A, has increased in importance in
the field of corporate law and that reformers of corporate taxation attempt
to change their specialty to reflect this change in A's relative weight. In
this case, a successful reform would hardly imply that corporate taxation
had lost its structural subordination to corporate law ideas. Instead, the
substantive change would imply a structural continuity.
20
Reforms that do imply structural change, moreover, can be of very dif-
ferent sorts. At one extreme, reform of a dependent field like corporate
tax may imply a quantum leap forward in the field's claim to autonomy
and domination. Rather than meekly importing basic ideas from other
areas of dispute resolution, a reform group may generate a new and au-
tonomous model of corporate taxation and argue that existing law should
be revolutionized to comport with their new ideas. "Autonomizing" re-
form of this type is the analogue of Scientific Revolution of the kind that
19. Compare id. with pp. 137-52. Principle Six is a possible exception. See pp. 151-52.
But cf. p. 153 (only General Utilities principle could be reversed without "major doctrinal
disadvantages").
20. Of course, the rising importance of A as a principle of corporate law may (though
it need not) imply a change in the structural relations between corporate law and some
other set of legal ideas. But this is consistent with the continuing structural domination
of corporate principles over corporate taxation.
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Thomas Kuhn discusses in his famous book.21 Such a dramatic change in
corporate taxation would signal to the legal community the possibility of
a paradigm shift-a new way of resolving previously troublesome diffi-
culties on the basis of a newly autonomous law of corporate taxation.
But reform may also be of a less exciting, though no less important,
variety. Rather than signaling a rise to autonomy, reform may suggest
merely a change in the patterns of structural dependence controlling the
conceptual field. It is this second (non-Kuhnian) kind of transformation,
I think, that is implied by the present effort to reform the corporate
tax law.
The point to remember here is the hybrid character of Subchapter C-
its structural dependence on two fields at once. This leads to my main
thesis about the structure of reform: rather than marking the rise of cor-
porate tax as a relatively autonomous body of law, reforms of the kind
suggested by Professor Clark indicate that corporate taxation may well
lose its hybrid character. Instead of trying to maintain dual dependence,
lawyers are becoming increasingly unhappy with the structural dominion
of corporate models over the field. Reformers, in short, are trying to build
a high wall of autonomy from corporate ideas so as to deepen and broaden
their field's reciprocity with allied areas of tax practice.
To confirm this thesis, one need only consider the central reform idea
of "full integration," which has been advanced by others and which Pro-
fessor Clark instructively elaborates.2 2 In essence, full integration repre-
sents a direct assault on the structural dominion of traditional corporate
ideas in corporate taxation. No longer will the tax law respect the basic
distinction between corporation and shareholder central to traditional
principles of substantive corporate law. Instead, the corporate veil will be
pierced as a matter of course in the computation of tax liabilities. In this
way the general principles of taxation may be given their full impact
without distortion by competing structural models. As Professor Clark
shows, 23 radical substantive change follows from this single structural
revision.
IV. Patterns of Adaptation
Thus far, I have merely sketched two different maps of a small part of
the conceptual universe inhabited by American lawyers. One describes the
existing structure; the other, a possible future one. The next step is to
compare the two maps: as the eye moves from one map to the other, the
mind may create a primitive moving picture, permitting a glimpse of a
richer pattern of lawyerly adaptation than each alone reveals.
In Stage One, marked by the present structure of Subchapter C, a first
21. T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970). Needless to
say, one would expect that such movements in law would exhibit many differences from
similar transformations in science. But an exploration of this comparative question must
await a far deeper and broader anthropological understanding of law (and science) than
we now possess.
22. Pp. 153-56. Although a structural analysis of Professor Clark's other proposals
would be useful, I do not think it necessary for my main point.
23. See pp. 155-56.
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legal generation confronted the task of adapting the legal culture to deal
with a "new" problem forced to the forefront by political action. The re-
sponse-Clark's Seven Principles-closely resembles the kind described by
much recent work in anthropology and the sociology of knowledge.2 4 Rath-
er than fashioning new conceptual tools to fit the problem, the first pro-
fessional reaction was to redefine the problem to fit conventional tools.
So long as the hold of conventional concepts was not questioned, enormous
complexity was tolerable, indeed welcomed as a lucrative source of pro-
fessional rewards.
In Stage Two, marked by the structure of reform, the legal community
has become increasingly uneasy with the initial effort at adaptation. The
legal generation that first gave a shape to corporate taxation is dead or
dying, and a new generation looks upon its parents' accomplishments from
a necessarily different perspective. Since their predecessors have succeeded
in giving the field at least a semblance of order, it is now only natural
that lawyers should ask whether this received order makes sense. Yet
however important the passage of time may be, it cannot account for our
present miscontents. Just as children reject their parents' achievements, so
too they may learn to venerate them. Why, then, are professional lawyers
tempted to view corporate taxation as ripe for reform rather than as part
of a hallowed tradition? Why is the corporate model losing its structural
power in legal discourse at a time when the large business enterprise bulks
so large in social reality?
An adequate answer to these questions would require a very elaborate
theory. Since I do not have such a theory, I shall content myself with
pointing to two general tendencies in the legal culture that should not
be ignored in a fuller account. The first is our inheritance from Legal
Realism. The present legal generation has been trained to be extremely
sensitive to, and skeptical of, legal doctrines that reify entities like "the"
Corporation and treat these entities as if they were independent human
beings. Hence lawyers are predisposed to condemn a doctrine premised
on the idea that a tax on corporations is different from a tax on the in-
dividuals who interact within the corporate shell. This critical tendency
invites the very kind of structural revision implicit in current substantive
reform proposals.
Realist sensibilities are reinforced by a second general impulse now trans-
forming the shape of the professional legal culture. I refer to the assimila-
tion of economic analysis into legal thought. Not only does the still-per-
vasive idea of "the" Corporation make little Realist sense, but the econo-
mists assure us that we are wrong in assuming that a tax on the corporate
form will necessarily be borne by its wealthy shareholders, rather than by
workers or consumers. Of course, economists cannot identify with any great
precision the people who do bear the corporate income tax.25 But doubt
about its ultimate incidence compounds Realist reservations.
24. See, e.g., P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CoNmSRucTION OF REALITY 127-35
(1966); M. DourLS, PURITY AND DANGER 41-58 (1966). Some remarks by Claude Levi-
Strauss arc particularly apt. See C. LEVI-STRAUSS, THE SAVAGE MIND 16-33 (1966).
25. See, e.g., MacClure, General Equilibrium Incidence Analysis: The Harberger
Model After Ten Years, 4 J. PUB. EcoN. 125 (1975); Shauvin, The Incidence and Efi-
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These two factors, however, merely predispose legal professionals to
question the present corporate income tax. Before such doubts may be
transformed into legal change, there must be legislative change. And within
the larger political culture, the idea of corporate taxation has a particular
significance quite distinct from its meaning within the narrower group
of professional lawyers. For masses of people who have never gone to law
school, the word "Corporation" symbolizes enormous entities with con-
centrated economic power; the word "Taxation" symbolizes a primary tech-
nique by which the state clubs people into line. "Corporate Taxation,"
then, symbolizes the popular notion that private entities of enormous power
are under state control. To tamper with the law of corporate taxation is
to do more than change the cognitive structure of the legal culture. It is
to endanger a cherished symbol in the political culture as well.20 Nor are
reformers blind to this. They will make much of the fact that corporations
still withhold funds under a "full integration" regime: they will insist
that they do not wish to abolish the corporate income tax so much as
improve it, and so forth. The opponents of reform, in contrast, will play
predictable populist themes: they will reify "the" Corporation and insist
that Little People should not be obliged to pay all the taxes while Big
Business goes free. A model of change in the legal culture, in short, re-
quires a model of change in the political culture, and vice versa.
V. A Postscript on Culture and Self-Interest
To talk about taxation without talking about economic self-interest is
to run the risk of preciosity. It is, of course, the great merit of the economic
approach to law that it avoids this defect. Here, actors are considered apart
from their particular cultures and are assumed to maximize some good (like
dollars) whose structure is far less complex than cultural coherence. Setting
the scene in this stark way permits one to focus upon the struggle for
economic power-the pattern of exaction and evasion-that is a central
aspect of tax law.
Anthropological analysis need not deny the power of this competitive
model. Instead, it should be taken to suggest that even in a field like cor-
porate taxation, where the economic model has obvious importance, the
bare appeal to self-interest does not tell the whole story.
What is required is a form of understanding that unifies the disparate




ciency Effects of Taxes on Income from Capital, 84 J. POLITICAL EcoN. 1261 (1976);
Stiglitz, The Corporation Tax, 5 J. PuB. ECON. 303 (1976). The importance of the inci-
dence issue in legal treatments of tax questions is discussed in Graetz, Assessing the Dis-
tributional Effects of Income Tax Revision: Some Lessons from Incidence Analysis, 4
J. LEcAL STUD. 351 (1975).
26. For some generally perceptive remarks on this point, see M. EDELMAN, THE SYM-
BOLIC USES OF POLITICS (1964).
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